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Any attempt to give a meaningful description of a nation's legislation in the social and economic field cannot disregard the environment
in which it was enacted. Such legislation is so intimately connected
with the philosophy and the social and economic conditions of the
nation that an analysis of the whole, or any part of it, must be preceded
by some broader remarks. Furthermore, such legislation often does
no more than authorize the government to act under certain circumstances; it leaves open the question of whether in fact it will act, and
if so, in what manner. This is particularly true of the Netherlands
Industrial Organization Act, which is based upon general assumptions
which are themselves the outgrowth of a typically national development; the act is intended to apply only to those industries in which
the underlying assumptions are fulfilled. But if the act as it has
developed reflects a national, rather than a European character, the
problems which it attempts to solve are universal.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

These problems have been brought on by the extensive growth
of "group activities" in the past hundred years, both public and
private. Among these activities are authorities acting for the national and local communities and movements by labor unions, farm
federations and manufacturers' and merchants' associations. Big
t Secretary to the Social and Economic Council of The Netherlands.
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business corporations might be included in the latter list, although in
Europe their power position seems inferior to the associations.
Today it is generally recognized that governments have a much
wider responsibility than was reflected in the practical application of
laissez-faire in the last century. Perhaps the most striking examples
of this are the expansion of monetary policy into a more general
economic policy designed to prevent depression and mass unemployment, and the introduction of social security legislation. Both
phenomena show that collective responsibility has come to supplement
individual responsibility.
Not only governments, but also private organizations have significantly, if gradually, extended their activities. Of course, neither
public nor private group activity has developed independently; many
government programs have been activated by private groups, and
often private movement has been stimulated by government measures.
There are other aspects of the relationship between government
and private groups where the influence of the one upon the other is
less direct. In many fields private groups can move without official
intervention, examples of which may be found in collective bargaining
contracts and monopolistic business practices. Although in most
countries the government does not control prices or wages, private
regulations affecting the same are not irrelevant to governmental
social and economic policies. This is particularly true in European
countries, where general prosperity depends to a high degree on foreign
trade, and where, therefore, the national economy is extremely sensitive
to wage and price fluctuations. The importance of this fact was apparent to the Ministerial Working Party in its Report to the Council
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in November
1956:
"Action by government in the monetary and fiscal fields can
be nullified or frustrated by the pressures of private groups to augment their money incomes disproportionately. Such increases
can despite government action lead to rises in producers' costs and
to a decline in the competitiveness of national exports in world
markets.

.

.

. The attainment of a stable economy requires

moderation in the pricing policies of industrialists and merchants,
moderation in the demands of farmers for price support, and
moderation in the demands of labour for wage increases. We
strongly urge that all those responsible for the formulation of
prices and wages should bear this in mind and make every effort
to help governments in the policies which they adopt to combat
the dangers of inflation." 1
1. MINISTRIUAL WORKING PARTY, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION
FOR EUROPEAN EcoNoMIc COOPZRATION (1956).
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Private organizations such as we have been discussing have been
traditionally regarded, in legal contemplation, as individuals. This
concept is still workable for many purposes of the civil law. But in
the organization of national life in the larger sense, these groups
cannot be placed on an equal footing with individuals whose activities
neutralize, and whose behavior, so far as it is legal, is usually considered
of no concern to the community as a whole. In truth, private organizations-labor or entrepreneurial-have with the government a responsibility for the now vital issue of social prosperity. We are thus
confronted with the question of the mutual relation between public and
private power in a democratic society. To consider the question is
to consider, in the words of John M. Clark, that "a society in transition
now faces .

.

. the great problems of freedom and responsibility,

community and market mechanism, political and economic agency."

2

The Dutch Approach
These are the problems which are the subject of the Dutch
Industrial Organization Act. The act does not introduce principles
heretofore unknown to the political system of the Netherlands; on
the contrary, it represents an effort to consolidate some of the results
already achieved. In addition, the act is intended to give new impetus
to a development which, when it began some decades ago, had no
immediate connection with the imperative need for some form of
cooperation between the government and private organizations which
modem economic insight and policy has created. Indeed, the reasons
for the act are not pragmatic only, but are founded upon certain conceptions of the position and responsibility of groups in a society that
would have to succeed the era of liberal social and economic policy.
These conceptions originated in the middle of the last century
but they did not become politically important until the last years of
that century and the early years of the present, when the legislator
hesitantly began to occupy himself with working hours, compulsory
insurance and the like. The new policy led to a reaction mainly among
the Protestant and Catholic groups, which traditionally have had their
own political parties. Their philosophy was based on the idea that within
the national community there are smaller communities, not only territorial such as municipalities, but also non-officially organized as
evidenced by different branches of industry consisting of entrepreneurs
2. CLARK, AL~RNAIVZS o Sar~om 1 (1947). Professor Clark's thoughts about
the organization of society have much in common with the thoughts underlying the
Industrial Organization Act.
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and labor.3 It was argued, therefore, that if social regulations were
necessary they should be made, in principle, by the group itself and
not the government. However, since labor was at the time weak,
making self-regulation impractical, it was proposed that upon the
request of the interested group, the administration of legislation in the
social field be entrusted to special organizations, with boards composed
of an equal representation of employers and labor. Since 1922 this
method has in fact been gradually introduced and accepted; at present
a large part of the vast social insurance system, though regulated by
law, is administered by such group organizations. One of the benefits
of this method is that representatives of labor and employers have
become acquainted and been helped to develop a sense of common
responsibility by meeting regularly and facing joint tasks.
That private groups should eventually take part in the administration of regulations that are of particular interest to them has never been
a subject of serious political controversy. It was generally acknowledged, even by the Labor and Liberal Parties, that the anticipated
growth of government regulation in social and economic fields would
create a danger of a powerful bureaucracy. It was also argued that
the regulations would better accomplish their purpose if those to whom
they would apply would in some way cooperate voluntarily in their
preparation and administration.
Behind these arguments lay the conviction that a purely individualistic approach as the guiding principle to the organization of society
was not tenable--or would not be so in the long run. We cannot
explain here the theories that have developed in this connection, other
than to point out that there have been several, each related to the
various religious and political convictions held by different parts of
the population. One distinction should be mentioned, however: The
Protestant and Catholic theories, though caused by the "social question" that began to occupy minds during the last century, were not
derived from an economic theory, but were aimed first in a more general
way at a new organization of society. The economic consequences
were very often not worked out clearly. The socialists, on the other
hand, aimed more directly toward a new economic system, viz., an
economy more or less controlled by public authorities. These different
3. It must be noted that the theory about the State held by the religious groups
does not derive from the French Revolution and that they did not share its antipathy
against group-activity outside the framework of the State. Another point of interest is
that the theory put forward by the religious groups is directed against the theory of
class-struggle. As for the Catholics, the rule that the State must not assume tasks which
can be fulfilled as well or better by inferior bodies in society was, in its application to
social economic life, first set forth in the encyclical letter Return Novarurn par. 36
(1891), which was followed in 1931 by the Quadragesino Anno paras. 81-98 (1931).
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starting points led, and still lead, to different conceptions of the way
the system should be applied. Present day views on economic policy
have done much to bring the groups together, but differences over the
degree of regulation and the ultimate objectives being pursued nevertheless subsist. However, it can be said that in daily practice there is
a good deal of agreement on the position of groups in society. As the
groups themselves confess to conform to this vision, it has in fact
become an integral part of the national way of life.
The ideas upon which agreement exists can be described as follows. It is recognized that groups other than the national community
have as real a function in society as the State. They are much closer
to the common man than the State and they offer him the first opportunity to discharge his obligations toward others. On the other hand,
there is an increasing tendency to concentrate more and more power
in the central government, thus removing us gradually from the ideal
that people should govern themselves. It is indeed clear that elected
government-or, as in the Netherlands, a government controlled by
and finally dependent upon an elected body-is consistent with this
ideal as far as general political problems are concerned. In the administration of more technical matters, however, the central government is, in the main, as unsuited as it would be unfit to perform the
functions of local government. It is reasoned that a further development in the direction of centralization would be incompatible with the
democratic standard, as it leads not only to a certain despotism, but
also deprives the people of opportunities to take the initiative--opportunities which may serve the common interest as well as do the acts
of government. It is concluded, therefore, that a society which must
stimulate the sense of responsibility of its citizens-and upon its capacity to do this the democratic system finally rests-must encourage
and respect group activity by leaving, whenever possible, to the groups
the tasks that cannot be fulfilled by individuals, instead of entrusting
them to the government.
The general idea may be illustrated by the organization of education in the Netherlands. Concomitant with the obligation imposed
upon parents that their children attend school until they reach a
certain age, the government provides schools. But it is reasoned that,
on principle, the State is concerned only with the standards of compulsory education, not with the way in which parents comply with their
obligation. Therefore, there is no difference in the treatment of public
and private schools which meet the requirements of the law; parents
who wish to maintain their own educational organization are helped
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by the State in the same manner as parents who prefer the State
schools. The almost unanimous adoption of this principle in 1917 has
spared the Netherlands a paralysis of internal politics from which some
other European countries are still suffering, and has led to a situation
in which about two-thirds of the nation's children attend subsidized
schools most of which have been established by committees of the
various religious groups.
Inter-Business Agreements
In light of the foregoing discussion, we next turn to the more
specific areas of the social and economic field to consider the attitude toward collective bargaining and inter-business agreements. It
is realized, of course, that such agreements can threaten the market
mechanism upon which the economic system primarily rests, and that
particularly when the organizations are motivated by pure self interest, a situation could arise in which the national community would
be disintegrated into a number of warring factions. However, it is
believed that in principle these dangers should not be faced by negative
methods, partly for reasons set forth heretofore, and partly because it is
believed that the process underlying the tendency toward collective
measures is too strong to check effectively. Instead, there is a positive
approach which appreciates these activities as one of the facts of
social life. It acknowledges the danger of disintegration, but stresses
that this development also offers opportunities for a needed integration
of the groups into the national life. The essence of the method is to
impress a sense of responsibility for the public interest upon the organizations; among others, by legislation which induces them to assume voluntarily a role in formulating policy. In this view, economic
life is regarded as a part of social life; the market mechanism is not
considered as a purpose in itself, but with regard to its function in
social life and as subordinate to the requirements of social order. This
view, at first held only by a critical minority, has become quite general-perhaps as a consequence of the increasing awareness, from a
purely economic standpoint, of the imperfections of the market mechanism. Of course, there are still many shadings of opinion on this;
today the most prevalent and perhaps increasing view is that competition is an essential feature of economic organization. This judgment differs from that of the last century, however, in that it is accompanied by reservations as to the particular markets where (e.g.,
labor), and the circumstances under which, competition will take
place.
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In this climate the collective bargaining agreement has grown
prosperously. About one-third of labor is organized and there are
agreements in almost every industry. Normally these are nation-wide
agreements between labor unions and employer organizations. Since
the collective agreements regulate competition within the labor market
and the unions are national in scope, the employers also negotiate
through national associations; collective bargaining agreements for
individual firms are exceptional. In a number of industries joint
labor-employer agencies have been established to administer the
agreements; more than once this has led to a permanent institution in
which labor and employer work together, usually on matters of particular interest to the workers, although in many cases the general
economic problems of the industry are also discussed. Since 1937
the government is empowered, if requested, to make the rules of a
collective bargaining agreement binding on all those belonging to the
industry concerned. 4
The entrepreneurs are also rather well organized. The growth
of farmers', manufacturers' and merchants' associations was greatly
stimulated by the depression of the thirties and by World War II. The
principal activities of these associations are distributing information
to members and dealing with the government in matters concerning
their respective industries. In most cases these are the same organizations that take part in collective bargaining. It should be noted, however, that often the organizations, particularly the farm-federations, do
not confine themselves to defending the interests of their members, but
also help them to improve methods of production.
Private agreements to restrict competition are not forbidden, but
they must be reported to the government. However, this does not imply that they are generally viewed with disfavor. As in the case of
collective bargaining agreements, the government has the power
(since 1935) to make an agreement restricting competition binding
upon the industry concerned if requested. This power was retained
in the Act on Economic Competition of 1956.2
The last mentioned provisions-which in some ways may remind
the reader of the National Industrial Recovery Act in the United
4. Act of May 25, 1937, [1937] ST.TSBLAD 217. Since World War II the act has
been administered by the Government Mediation Board by virtue of the Extraordinary
Decree on Labor Relations 1945, STAATSBLAD 178. For a more detailed description of
industrial relations in the Netherlands, that touches also on the Industrial Organization
Act, see Pels, The Developnnent of Collective Employment Agreements in the Netherlands, in CONTSmPORARY COLLicTmVE BARGAINING IN SEVXX COUNTRIES c. 3 (Sturmthal

ed. 1957); Pels, The Labor Foundationin the Netherlands, 2 INT'L LABOR REV. 321

(1957). Sturmthal's book refers to agreements binding on an entire industry as "extensions." SURMTnAL, oP. cit. supra,at 328.
5. Act on Economic Competition [1956] STAATSBLAD 401.
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States-clearly show the tendency to encourage efforts of private
groups to act for themselves when they think arrangements necessary. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the government
is behaving passively in the case of private agreements. There are
two important reservations in the law. First, agreements can be made
binding on others only if this is required by the public interest (or, ununder the 1956 act, for agreements restricting competition, only if they
are compatible with the public interest). The practice during the
years before the war-circumstances prevent drawing conclusions from
the practice during the years since that time-made clear that the
government, particularly in the case of agreements restricting competition, is not easily convinced that this requirement has been
fulfilled. 6 The second proviso is that the government has the power
to nullify collective bargaining or competition-restricting agreements
if it finds them contrary to the public interest. In recent years a
number of agreements, particularly those dealing with prices and
exclusive dealings, were nullified.'
The Concept of PrivateResponsibility
The policy of the government to leave, so far as possible, responsibility for public matters with the people, assumes a gradual
development and acceptance of the idea that private groups must act in
the light of their relations with other groups and the community at
large. This concept had in fact already developed to some extent
under the influence of previously mentioned theories of societal organization. It is expected that it will become more solidly accepted if
group responsibility is more formally defined, under the assumption that
formal responsibility will discourage irresponsible behavior. Progress
in this direction, of course, depends upon changes in mental disposition,
especially on the part of the members of groups, who are not, as are
their leaders, immediately confronted with the broader issues.
The groups are not required to serve directly the public interest,
as this is clearly beyond their competence. In many cases, however,
they can indirectly advance the public interest by serving their own
interests with moderation. The "division of labor" between govern6. Examples would require an elaborate description of cases. However, of twentyone requests during the period July 1 to December 31, 1938, seven were granted, five of
which concerned agreements dealing with conditions of sale.
7. I am afraid that examples would only give a very inadequate idea of the cartel
policy pursued by the government. This policy has been summarized (in Dutch) in two
articles by P. Verloren van Themaat VAN THEmAAT, SocIAAL-ECONOMaSCE[E WETCSVING 129-53 (1952)
(covering the period 1945-52) and SociAAL-EcoNoMiscHz Wisr-

1-24 (1957) (covering the period 1952-56). Mr. Verloren van Themaat is the
head of the cartel division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
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mental and private agencies must be such that matters closely connected with the public interest are decided by the government, while
matters more loosely related thereto are left to boards whose members
are nominated by the organizations of the groups. For matters that
lie in the penumbra some cooperative method must be found.
For the system to be workable it is essential that the relation on
each of the several levels be balanced. In a democratic society government and private agencies are mutually independent. Each has its own
responsibilities; the one to the elected Parliament, the other to its
members. In principle, therefore, there are two factors which might
impede or even prevent fruitful cooperation. First, in a field in which
cooperation is necessary it is uncertain that there will be agreement
between government and private group as to the ultimate goals of the
policy to be followed. Second, if a conflict arises, the government is
very often the stronger of the two parties.
Theoretically these problems seem insolvable. Of the first it might
be said that the members of the groups are at the same time voters, so
that some general agreement on the ultimate goals of social-economic
policy is probable. This reasoning is only valid if the government has
an overwhelming majority, as has been the case in the Netherlands in
recent years. Nevertheless, it can be argued that serious conflicts-at
least under circumstances in the Netherlands-would never be very
probable. In this connection, it should be noted that the sharp
divergencies of opinion on principles of social and economic policy
which were so prominent in the past have greatly diminished. In
addition, experience shows that agreement on practical issues is today
nearly always possible. This inclination toward compromise should
make the system workable even if the government is inspired by
principles not shared by all its partners; consider as an example the
relations between the present British Government and British trade
unions-relations certainly not excluding cooperation.
The importance of the problem raised by the apparent inequality
between the parties depends upon the way in which they approach
their mutual relationship. If they are inspired by a clear insight into
their respective responsibilities, and if public opinion is well informed on
their positions, undue pressure from either side is unlikely.
A final, rather special facet of the idas behind the organization
under the act should be mentioned. In a system where interested
parties are invited to participate in policy deliberations, there is a
problem as to the proper role of labor in the formulation of economic
policy. The answer to this problem is that the condition of labor is
finally dependent upon the management of economic life; if labor has no
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part in it, any responsibility from labor as a group is impossible. It is
essential, therefore, that a policy that intends to integrate all groups into
the management of society should give labor, according to its wishes,
an equal say in defining economic policy. This applies at the national
and industry level, but not at the level of individual enterprises, where
such co-responsibility would be incompatible with the executive position and authority of the entrepreneur. In dealing with collective policy
measures, however, neither the special position of the entrepreneur nor
a lack of ability on the part of labor is considered an objection.
THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC COUNCIL

The Industrial Organization Act provides for the institution
of a Social-Economic Council which acts at the national level, and
for boards which operate on the industry level, to be considered later
in this Article. The Social-Economic Council is established by the
act itself, with the task "of promoting such economic activity as will
serve the interest of the Netherlands people, and of protecting the interests of trade and industry and those engaged therein." ' It consists of forty-five members; two-thirds are appointed by organizations
of entrepreneurs (generally central) and central organizations of employees designated by the Crown, while one-third are appointed by the
Crown. Employees and entrepreneurs are equally represented, while
the Crown appointees are independent experts rather than representatives of particular bodies; the government itself is not represented. The
main function of the Council is to advise the ministers on matters of a
social or economic nature.
The Council's establishment resulted from two roughly parallel
developments-one social, the other economic. As in most countries,
World War I was a great stimulus for social legislation in the Netherlands. As early as 1919 a council to advise the government on matters
of a social nature was instituted. Its constitution contained even
then the essential elements of the Social-Economic Council-equal
representation of labor and employers and the participation of experts.
This contributed much toward promoting mutual understanding between the leaders of labor unions and employer organizations and
toward their understanding of the responsibilities and administrative
problems with which the government is confronted. The Council,
which had played an important role in the preparation of social legis8. Act of January 27, 1950, [1950] (Industrial Organization Act) SrAATsBLAD 35
(hereinafter cited as the Act). The quotations of paragraphs are taken from a translation in English of the Public Relations Office of the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
edited by the Social-Economic Council.
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lation during the years between the wars, was temporarily replaced
after World War II by a private institution secretly prepared during
the occupation and established by the national labor and employer organizations. Known as the Foundation of Labor, its purpose was
defined in its charter as being "to secure on a basis of cooperation of
the organizations of employers and labour lasting, good social relations in Dutch trade and industry." ' The Foundation was immediately
recognized by the government as an advisory body. In this capacity it
has scored good results. Social policy was formulated in close collaboration by the government and Foundation, after having met with
great difficulties in a country whose whole economy and social structure
had been wrecked-the latter as the consequence of German abolishment of all political parties and other organizations and the mass abduction of hundreds of thousands of laborers. Through all this, the
Foundation has succeeded in preserving its unity, while its sponsoring
organizations have retained-the confidence of their members, as shown
by the fact that strikes have been almost unknown since the liberation.
The Foundation continues to act as the government's advisor in the
administration of national wage-policy introduced as a part of the reconstruction program after the war.
An advisory board for economic matters was a later development.
It was not until 1932, in connection with the great depression, that
an Economic Council was established. At first this council, unlike the
earlier social-advisory council, was not comprised of private organization representatives but of experts. Characteristically, its members
resigned when a new government came into office after the 1937 election. However, in this field also there were gradual developments
toward the present scheme, and during the last years before the war
three of the fifteen members were appointed after consultation with the
central labor unions.
After World War II the situation completely changed. This war,
even more than its predecessor, stimulated desire for improvement of
the social structure. Social and economic policy now had to deal
with problems quite different and much more fundamental than before.
Not only was there the problem of reconstruction, there were also
radical changes in the general situation; the loss of the Asian colonies,
the relative decline of economic strength, particularly in relation to
countries overseas, the loss of capital and apparatus, the heavy cost of
armament and the comparatively rapid growth of population in an
already densely populated country all tended to make a completely new
9.

FouNDATIOx

oF LBOR, AxNuAL

REPoRT

(1946).
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start inevitable. A more comprehensive approach in re-shaping the
apparatus for social and economic policy was considered an essential
to the national effort. It is true that the Foundation of Labor could
already be considered a remarkable innovation; nevertheless, a number
of reasons dictated that a more definitive form for the cooperation of
government and private organizations be found.
First was the need for a more exact definition and formal organization of the advisory function in social-economic matters. It should be
noted in this connection that since 1922 the Dutch Constitution has
required statutory regulation of permanent advisory bodies of the
government.'0 The motivation for this was that-as was rightly foreseen-advisory bodies can have such an influence in the preparation of
bills that Parliament, and not the government alone, should control their
institution and organization. For this reason it was obvious after
World War II that parliamentary action was necessary, especially since
the motive for the constitutional provision was particularly valid in
the social and economic field. Where the government and organizations have deliberated and reached a conclusion (which, from a psychological point of view has the character of an agreement to which
both parties are morally bound) rejection by the Parliament is only
possible under very special circumstances.
Another reason for more definitive provisions was that there
was no guarantee that the brilliant achievements of the Foundation
of Labor would be lasting. It would have been unnatural if unity
and discipline, accomplished under the strain of emergency, were
to continue in a period in which prosperity instead of poverty had to be
distributed. A failure to reach agreement within the Foundation
would not have been grave in itself; the result, however might have
spelled the end for future cooperation. As the system of joint responsibility of government, labor union, trade and industry had in many
ways worked satisfactorily, some form of consolidation was desirable.
A final reason for a new approach was that the Foundation was
competent only in matters of social policy, which was bound in the
long run to give rise to difficulties. As mentioned above, an important aspect of post-war social policy was the national wage-policy.
Roughly defined, it recognizes the dangers of inflation; in cooperation

with the organizations the level of wages is controlled. Such a wagepolicy, however, is dependent on the movement of prices, which in
turn is especially influenced by government policies respecting agricul10. NETHRANDS CONST. art. 87 (1956). The Dutch Constitution is amended.
rather often and amendments are incorporated in the original text, thus causing a
change in the numeration of the articles. For this reason, the date was mentioned.
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ture, rent control, food subsidies, and eventually price control. Consequently, the organizations which share responsibility for the wagepolicy must also be consulted in a number of decisions in the field of
economic policy. This field was, of course, considered in the deliberations of the government and Foundation; nevertheless, it is understandable that legal confirmation of labor's right of consultation was
preferred.
Special Characteristics
At this point it may be in order to discuss some of the SocialEconomic Council's more significant characteristics. An important
aspect is the Council's independence of the government; the government designates the organizations of entrepreneurs and employees who
in turn appoint two-thirds of the members, but the rules governing
designation effectively prevent this from influencing the Council. The
government also appoints one-third of the members directly. These
appointees are, however, experts rather than government representatives, and it is understood that their choice will be made in such a way
that no political party can have reason to object. There are official
contacts between government and Council through ministers' representatives who may attend the Council's and its commissions' meetings with a voice but no vote. The intention and the practice is that
these liaison officers confine themselves to supplying information. The
Council's president is appointed from among its members by the Crown,
but as the Council is heard before a recommendation is made to the
Crown, this can hardly be considered an encroachment upon its independence. The Council is also financially independent as it meets
expenses by a surtax levy and from certain contributions.
Nor is the Council dependent on the organizations. Unlike the
Foundation of Labor, the organizations as such are not represented;
their role is confined to appointing members who, in accord with the
Industrial Organization Act, are to vote independently of previous
instructions or consultations. Formally, therefore, the organizations
are not bound by the Council's decisions. This distinction from the
Foundation is accentuated by the presence of the government appointed experts, which stresses the personal responsibility of those who
participate in the deliberations. Of course, members appointed by the
organizations, generally their leaders, vote as a rule according to their
organizations' view; in fact, there is a strong analogy in the attitudes
of Parliament's members towards questions upon which their party has
taken an official position. Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction
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between the Council and the organizations. An organization has no
direct responsibility for an advice of the Council even if its appointees
vote for it, though morally those members are bound to defend the
advice within their organization. This is one of the facts which by way
of comparison makes the present system somewhat more loose than
that of the Foundation.
Another distinguishing characteristic of the Council as compared
with the Foundation is the membership of experts whose participation
has several important consequences. It compels the members appointed by the entrepreneurs and employees to justify their views
before independent men, which helps prevent the discussions from lapsing into negotiations between parties. More generally, this also contributes to an improvement in the organizations' standards outside the
Council. A closely connected additional point is that the participation
of experts means that obtaining a majority (an advice is drawn in
conformity with the opinion of an absolute majority) is not dependent
on agreement between entrepreneurs and labor. In this respect the
system works easier than a bipartite board, where efforts are largely
directed toward the agreement of the two constituent groups.
It should be understood, however, that the Social-Economic
Council does not operate as a tripartite body in which labor and the
employers vie for the experts' support. This would be impossible, if
only because the experts are not a homogeneous group. The same lack
of homogeneity characterizes the entrepreneur and labor factions.
Among the entrepreneurs, the manufacturing industries have four
representatives, agriculture and small-business three each, commerce
two, and banking, insurance and transport one each. Labor representation is divided among three central organizations; the federation
connected with the Labor Party has seven members, the Protestant
federation has three, and the Catholic five. In turn each of these federations has a strong position toward its affiliated unions. There are,
therefore, many more distinctions among the members than the tripartite scheme would suggest; deliberations do not have the character
of a battle of interests as much as might at first be expected. These
interests are nevertheless present, and there are instances, as for example in the preparation of advice on the wage-policy, in which they
dominate. There are, however, many issues on which other considerations than immediate interest are preponderant.
A third aspect of expert participation is the weight they lendl
an advice of the Council by making it more than a mere expression
of group interests. Indeed, if the three main factions agree, it means
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that policy based on the advice will be supported by the most influential
groups in social life, and moreover, that an integration of practical
experience, social requirements and theoretical knowledge has been
achieved.
Evaluating the political significance of an advice of the Council
leads to its constitutional position, the last characteristic that requires
discussion. As was shown above, the Council has a somewhat
amphibious character; on the one hand it is designed to provide the
government with expert advice on both the theoretical and practical
level in dealing with social and economic policy, while on the other
hand, it is intended to allow social groups to exert a formalized influence in the formulation of this policy. The first trait is more apparent in the expert membership; the second in the Council's preponderantly representative character. It is the latter element that is
most important from a constitutional standpoint; a means was needed
to conciliate the parliamentary system-a government responsible and
dependent upon the confidence of an elective body-with the formal
recognition of another agency. The solution has been found by imposing upon the ministers the obligation (unless they deem it contrary to the national interest) to seek the Council's advice on all important measures proposed in the social and economic field including the
introduction of new legislation. This implies that the government is
not dependent upon the Council for decisions; it is only obliged to hold
consultations to inform the Council of its intentions. Therefore, the
Council has no formal political influence. Nevertheless, there is in
fact usually strong pressure upon Parliament to comply with any advice,
the more so if it is unanimous. Thus, the influence of the Council is
in practice roughly proportional to the degree of unanimity it reaches.
This circumstance favors a spirit of compromise in the Council; indeed,
it has produced a unanimous advice on several important matters.
Authority
The predisposition of the government and parliament to comply
with the Council's advice which has been adopted by a substantial majority rests on obvious grounds. Any government action in accord can
expect support from large sections of the population, which is very
often needed to give the measures their intended effect. There is the
further, more fundamental argument that the very institution of the
Council as such implies that its advice should be followed excepting
only where they appear contrary to the public interest. This view
assumes that material governmental functions have been delegated to
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the Council, so that the qualification of its activities as "advisory" is an
understatement. This broad proposition is, however, far from being
generally accepted. It is felt, nevertheless, that too frequent departures
from the advice would imperil the Council's valuable contribution in
shaping policy. In practice, therefore, there is a reasonable balance
between the political and economic agencies.
It might be argued that the system has granted too much influence to some group interests and has a concomitant tendency to neglect other groups, e.g., those no longer taking part in production-a
segment that has particularly suffered from the gradual inflation following the war-or other interests in the social-economic field, as for example the consumer. This danger cannot be denied; however, the forces
at work within the framework of the Council would also have been present in its absence. Within the Council, moreover, they are continuously
confronted with the consequences their policy has for other groups.
Furthermore, the general public can evaluate their policy as the full text
of the Council's reports are published (deliberations are not held in
public). This does not prevent the organizations from acting outside
the Council as they see fit. But certainly their leaders' participation in
the Council's activities has a profound effect on their general policy
and attitude. This influence also extends to the associations of entrepreneurs and the various trade unions, for in matters of policy they
usually act in close consultation with the central organizations.
In Practice
The theoretical description of the Social-Economic Council may
be clarified by a consideration of some examples of its activity in
practice. The national wage-policy was mentioned as an important
part of the present day Netherlands economy. In this connection, the
Council periodically reports to the government on the general economic
situation and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom in the formulation
of policy and the distribution of income. These reports usually draw
the most attention of all the Council's activities.
A recent example," published in November 1956, may serve as
an illustration. This report was requested by the government, which
had already given some general indications of the solution to the problem. The Council found that the economy was overstrained-and was
likely to become more so when the national old-age pension scheme
came into effect in January 1957.
OF

The recommendation was that ex-

11. REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS AND EXPENDITURE IN THE
THE NETHERLANDS (Social-Economic Council Pub. No. 8, 1956). (The
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penditures be cut, not only by the government, but by the enterprises
and workers. Specifically, it was suggested that among other measures,
the old age pension premiums should not be fully compensated by wage
increases, that prices should remain stable and that investments should
be cut. These principles were adopted by the government, the entrepreneurs and labor. Of course, a report such as this puts the system
to a hard test which it might not be able to stand repeatedly. Fortunately, the growing prosperity in recent years has made for a smooth
working of the system in that moderation rather than sacrifice was all
that was requested.
The Council's advice is also concerned with a multitude of more
limited subjects. There have been numerous reports on new social
security legislation, among which was a quasi-unanimous advice on
the above mentioned pension scheme, and on such subjects as working
hours and paid holidays. In the economic field there have been a
series of reports dealing with the renewal of legislation which have,
for example, considered drafts of bills on such subjects as enterprise
establishment, economic competition (cartel legislation) and agricultural policy. The last mentioned activity is interesting in view of the
fact that policy concerning this part of the economy often tends to
become isolated, thus indicating that the Council is being considered as
an integrating mechanism.
Advisory boards like the Council have also been instituted in
France and Belgium. However, their structure and general position in
society seem less important than that of the Dutch Council. A project
contemplating an advisory board is now being prepared in Italy. The
Treaty instituting the European Economic 'Community also provides
for a Social and Economic Council.
In addition to its advisory function, the Council is empowered to
issue orders on those subjects the regulation of which might be given to
it by law. To the present this power has been theoretical since no
such legislation has been enacted. It will probably remain so. Any
regulation by the Council would have to cover the whole field of trade
and industry; regulation of such a general character would be so closely
connected with government policy that it seems more rational to reserve it to that body. Furthermore, the law can require the council to ,
assist in its administration. This provision has been applied in several cases where the administration did not involve important aspects of
government policy and the Council-being closer to the interested
groups-was considered better able than the government to adapt the
administration to practical needs. Finally, an important part of the
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Council's work is concerned with the institution of commodity and
industrial boards.
COMMODITY AND INDUSTRIAL BOARDS

The general principles underlying the institution and constitution
of commodity and industrial boards were the same as led to the establishment of the Council. The fundamental idea was that at the level
of individual industries, as at the national level, some responsible authority could be established. The definition of the task of the boards is
approximately parallel with the task of the Council. It consists in
"promoting such conduct of business by the enterprises for which they
have been instituted as shall serve the interest of the Netherlands
people, and protecting the common interest of those enterprises and
the persons engaged therein."
Like the Council, the boards have
their own special responsibility as opposed to government responsibility for the general welfare. They too are independent of the government.
The boards are distinguishable from the Council, however, in
several important respects. It has always been recognized that the
grant of public power to private groups requires a sufficiently developed
group-life maturity. While this is considered present in organizations
which act at the national level, the same cannot be assumed at the
level of separate industries. With respect to commodity and industrial
boards, therefore, the act confines itself to establishing a set of general
rules which govern their constitution and activities, and a procedure
for their institution. The institution itself depends on a law or
a Royal Administrative Decree.
Another reason for this system of individualized institution is
that in order to be effective the assumption of responsibility which
goes with the institution of a board as a rule must be voluntary. To
compel a general assumption of responsibility would not lead to the
intended results., The policy of voluntary cooperation implies it is not
the intention to cover economic life with boards according to a preconceived pattern; rather there is to be a more or less "natural," unsystematic growth. The results of this policy will be considered later.
Another distinction is that while the Council's activity is mainly
advisory, the boards are intended to apply themselves more directly to
the administration of their industries. To this end, they have the power
to regulate certain matters (autonomous regulating power) and can be
required to assist in the administration of laws (self-government).
Although the Council has apparently similar purposes, its administra12. The Act, art. 71.
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tive activity is destined to remain rather rudimentary. The attribution
of regulatory power does not imply that most of the activity of the
boards will be expressed in the issuance of orders; there are many other
ways to promote the interests with which they are entrusted, such as
advising the government or reporting to the members of their respective industries on that industry's problems. Although regulatory
power is an important aspect of the boards, and in many ways the most
far reaching-as the government has put it-this does not mean that
this power will be the most important for every board.
Finally, a remarkable distinction can be seen in the respective
composition of the boards' committees and of the Council. These
committees are composed solely of representatives of entrepreneurs and
labor. Independent experts, whose participation was often thought
essential in the earlier discussions of industrial organization, are
lacking. Several factors account for this. It would be more difficult to
find independent experts at the separate-industry level than at the national level, where general economic and social knowledge rather than
specialization is required. It would also be contrary to the tradition
of group activity in the industries if experts took part in other than an
advisory capacity. Furthermore, it might be argued that the formulation of policy at this level is so far removed from the public interest
(especially since much discretion here is limited by the necessity to
move within the already formulated general national-level policy) that
expert participation is not necessary. A final, although for some the
most important, distinction may be the difference in the natures of the
Council and the boards. Thus, the boards are primarily administrative
in character and should, therefore, operate through committees consisting solely of persons representing those whose activities are being
administered. The Council, on the other hand, is largely an advisory
body and the requirement of a representative character is much less
strongly felt.
The last point was considered at somewhat greater length here
than the public discussion preceding and at the time of the act's adoption might seem to warrant. This was done because a foreign reader
might observe that decisions in the social and economic field often have
consequences for others than those belonging to the industry concerned and, therefore, it may be in order to point out by what means
the public interest and the interests of the customer and the general consumer are protected.
First, it must be recalled that not every branch of industry isconsidered capable of having a board-they are instituted only if the
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group is pursuing its interests with moderation. There are, moreover
a number of institutional safeguards, the most important of which lie
(1) in the general restrictions on the regulatory power and in its application to the structure of the body concerned; (2) in the rule that
drafts of proposed orders must be published and that consultations and
decisions thereon be public; and (3) in the rule that orders of the
boards in general are subject to the government's approval.
The general restrictions on regulatory power are found, in part,
in the act itself. It states that the establishment, expansion and closing
of enterprises shall not be regarded as subjects of regulation to be left
to the boards. Thus, the boards cannot prohibit entry into industry as
a means of restricting competition. Furthermore, practice has established that the importation of goods is not a proper subject of board
regulation. Both provisions show that competition is a datum for the
boards, and that their activity cannot go beyond organizing it. Enterprise establishment and importation are not matters completely without
the boards' concern, but in these areas they are confined to assisting
in the administration of government measures; these exist chiefly in
small business (enterprise establishment) and agriculture (importation). Practice has also dictated that price regulation be allowed only in
exceptional cases.13
The discussion of general restrictions may give the impression
that the boards in principle have an undefined regulatory power; this
is not true. Their regulatory power extends only to subjects specifically attributed to them. As was noted, there are two forms of industrial organizations; commodity boards and industrial boards. The
latter (bedriifschappen) are defined by the act as "public bodies for
enterprises performing equal or related economic functions." '4 (Boards
for the textile industry, or agriculture would be examples.) 15 Their
regulatory power is confined to certain subjects whose regulation is not
considered as having serious consequences for other groups. Commodity boards (produkteschappen) may be instituted for "two or more
groups of enterprises performing different economic functions in respect of certain commodities or groups of commodities." 16 A commodity board for textiles, for example, would include the enterprises
13. See p. 521 infra.
14. The Act, art. 66.
15. General industrial boards can also be instituted (hoofdbedriifchappen). These
boards are intended for exceptional cases. An example is the "hooffdbedrijfschap" for
retail trade which has been instituted, next to which could be instituted "bedrijfschappen" for certain branches of retail trade. The latter are not intended to be subordinate
to the former, but the former are intended to treat more general problems that are outside the range of vision of industrial boards.
16. The Act, art. 66.
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producing or importing raw materials, the textile fabricators and the
finished product merchants. It is not necessary that these components
have industrial boards.
Commodity boards can exercise regulatory power over subjects
in which two parties of a market are interested. These are, therefore,
much better suited to perform important regulatory functions than the
industrial boards; it is interesting to note in this connection that the
president of a commodity board is appointed by the government, whereas the president of an industrial board is appointed by the board committee (with government approval).
There are cases where more than one branch of industry is
interested in the regulation of the matter, but the interest of one of the
groups is not such as to justify the institution of a commodity board.
To meet this situation, an intermediate structure has been developed;
an industrial board with a special advisory commission attached
composed of an even representation between the two groups. Together
with the rules on publicity and the requirement of government approval,
this provision seems to safeguard sufficiently the interests of third
parties. The same device can be used where special interests of the
general consumer are at stake. Insofar as the consumer has a general,
rather than a special interest in certain regulations, such as in low
prices and large assortments, the breadth of interest is considered
sufficient to allow government approval of orders to provide the needed
protection. In addition, as in the Council's case, the ministers appoint representatives who attend meetings of board committees. Although they have no vote, their presence reduces the danger that
board orders or decisions will be contrary to public interest. A final
safeguard lies in the Crown's power to annul decisions (including
orders) if contrary to law or the public interest.
The above summary indicates that serious risks can be eliminated
by the diligence of the government and other interested groups. To
conclude that the government's power of approval and annulment is
such that the boards are to a high degree dependent upon it in the
exercise of their regulatory powers, and that only those orders which
please the government become effective, would be erroneous. The
philosophy underlying the institution of commodity and industrial
boards, designed to allow independent activity, has been expressed in
the act by the provision that the government shall subject their orders
to a negative test only: an order will be annulled only if the government
can prove it in conflict with the public interest.'
The act's explicit
17. So far, no order has been annulled.
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recognition of this independent position of the boards has made necessary a conservative policy in attributing subjects upon which orders
can be made.
Procedure for Institution
The procedure followed in the institution of commodity or
industrial boards may be quickly summarized. Institution is not
promoted by the ministers until the Council has given its opinion,
either on its own motion or by request, and after it has consulted the
entrepreneurial and labor organizations. Where the Council of its
own accord advises the creation of a board, it does so only after
obtaining such organizations' approval as it considers sufficiently
representative of those concerned. This provision indicates the strong
preference for having a board institution supported by the Council
as well as the private organizations in that branch of industry. It
also shows the Council's role in board promotion, a task it was assigned
as being particularly suited for dealing with the organizations. This
is verified by the fact that most of the members of the Council's special
commission which deals with this problem are the central organizations'
appointees who are, therefore, well acquainted with the leaders of the
several branches of industry.
The main features of the boards' constitution have been discussed.
One additional provision is that the employee organizations shall appoint, with deviations in special circumstances, as many members of
the committee as the entrepreneurs. As with the Council, the board
committee members must vote independently as representatives of the
entire industry rather than as mandatories of their appointers.
The boards have regulatory, executive and advisory functions.
It was noted that the first power, which was given much attention in
the act and commentaries, is little used in practice. One provision,
however, states that "no order shall be an impediment to fair competition," '8 and although of little immediate practical significance, it is
an expression of one of the most fundamental ideas underlying the
act, namely that it is not intended to introduce a fargoing regulation
of the economy, but to maintain the system of a mixed economy in
which regulation is supplementary to competition. The government
stated in defense of the bill that:
"Industrial organization does not include a specific degree
of organization of social and economic life. It only concerns the
manner in which essential measures of an organizational nature
are effected. It provides industry with the powers to exert a real
18. The Act, art. 95, § 5.
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influence when it comes to deciding in regard to any subject
whether, and to what extent, it is desirable to lay down regulations
under the given circumstances." 19
The act enumerates the subjects of regulation which are attributable to the boards; although the list is comprehensive, only portions
of those subjects have actually been covered. In principle the boards
can regulate social as well as economic subjects. The act also provides
the boards with independent income through the imposition of levies
on their constituent enterprises.
Present Coverage
To the present, thirty industrial and fifteen commodity boards
have been instituted. The industrial boards cover agriculture (where
labor is also highly organized), forestry, a number of wholesale trades
in agricultural products, the hotel and catering industries, various
retail trades and crafts, coal mining and a number of manufacturing
industries. The commodity boards cover almost all agricultural
products. In all, about twenty-five per cent of the national production
is represented by an industrial or a commodity board or both.
The regulatory subjects taken as a whole cover a wide range.
In accord with previously mentioned principles, there is a marked
difference between the subjects given to the commodity, as compared
to the industrial boards. The former have been given general power
to regulate the production and marketing of their agricultural products.
However, this power is subject to the general restrictions and does not
include regulation of enterprise establishment, imports and exports, or,
with some exceptions, prices. In considering the nevertheless rather
extensive powers of the commodity boards, it should be recalled that
their activity is closely connected with the government's agricultural
policy and with the executive function (self-government) which they
fulfill in its connection. It is most improbable that a commodity board
outside the agricultural field would be entrusted with regulatory power
going beyond certain specified aspects of production and marketing.
Subjects of regulation left to industrial boards vary with the
character of the industry. In general, each board has a limited number
of rather narrowly defined subjects that may be classified in three
groups; technical (e.g., the quality of exported products-usually
agricultural) ; secondary aspects of competition (e.g., conditions of sale)
19. Memorandum in reply to a bill dealing with the organization of trade and
industry, as presented to the Upper Chamber of the States General (this bill has become the Industrial Organization Act).
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and wages. Many boards may regulate subjects falling within only
one or two of these groups.
In those cases where uniform conditions of sale have been left
as a subject of regulation, a provision has been made for a commission
in which purchasers are represented. One industrial board was
entrusted with the power to make general rules concerning cost accounting; in another case, the Council acquiesced in the government's
giving the board price-fixing power, to be effective, however, only in
emergency periods. This summary should indicate that neither the
government nor the Council is too inclined to allow the boards to
direct their attention primarily to measures intended to restrict competition.
CONCLUSIONS

The development thus far allows some conclusions to be drawn.
Generally speaking, the propensity to have an industrial board is
closely connedted with the structure of the industry. It appears that in
many industries in which boards were first requested, the small
producer or small business was dominant. The obvious reason is that
these industries are particularly suited for collective measures. Their
need is greater than in other fields where competition is mitigated by
the heavy capital investment required for entry and where superior
management is mandatory. As for agriculture, the special conditions
of production and market character are additional factors. In addition,
collective measures are especially needed in these industries because
individual effort cannot solve such problems as technical research,
management methods and unfair practices by individuals which discredit the entire industry, particularly in foreign markets. Also,
regulation is more easily applied to firms whose smallness tends to
create homogeneity.
The administration of the act also indicates a relation between
the institution of boards and the existence of legislation in that field.
Commodity boards would have been impossible in agriculture, for
example, without the opportunity for agriculture, and the manufacturing industry and trade connected with agriculture, to assist in the
administration of measures resulting from agricultural policy.
Tradition also seems an important factor. As previously noted,
the act is building on a development which has been maturing over
some decades; it is a phase in a continuous process. It is not surprising,
therefore, that those industries in which this process has been longest
in being are the first to request the institution of a board.
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In summarizing this outline of the Industrial Organization Act
in the Netherlands, it might first be observed that it is not intended to
introduce new economic principles in the sense of substituting government regulation of economic life for regulation by the market. This
follows from the independence of the boards, whose activity cannot
be coordinated by the government. Government cognizance does not
extend beyond the prevention of activity which is contrary to law or
the public interest. Coordination of economic activity must, therefore,
remain finally dependent on the market.
The act recognizes, however, that the market is not and should
not always be the only organizing power. It further recognizes that
group activity in the economic field, as such, is not objectionable, not
only for economic reasons, but also because it is a manifestation of the
structure of society. It indicates channels through which responsible
group activity can develop, and which further give the groups an
opportunity to participate in the administration of measures which
necessity compels the central authorities, and not the group themselves
to enact.
This still leaves many questions open. It provides no answer
for when action should be taken, what field of action should be left
to the boards and how power is to be distributed between the central
authorities and the boards. It is obvious that the answers are only
partly implied in the act, and that much depends upon general principles
of economic policy and the general economic situation. Accepting
this, it seems that the concept of the Council raises fewer problems
than the commodity and industrial boards. However much diversity
social and economic policy or the economic situation may show, today
government responsibility in these matters always covers a wide field;
it seems, therefore, beyond dispute'that there is room for a function
like the Council's, namely, to form a link between the political and
economic agencies on the highest level. Of course, this does not
imply that the social background can be neglected. The Council could
not have been instituted had there not been a degree of development of
organizational activity and a conscious effort by both the government
and the groups.
As for the boards, their institution-or the possibility thereofimplies that a certain measure of group activity in the social and
economic field is considered normal. The act does not purport to
define the limits of this activity. It establishes certain general principles-no prevention of entry into an industry, no impediments to
fair competition-but leaves further definition to the government's
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policy when instituting boards, and to the Council when advising on
their institution. So far this policy has been rather conservative. No
final conclusion can yet be drawn, however, for the very favorable
general economic situation in the country since 1950 has prevented the
problem from becoming urgent. It is illustrative, however, that demands for price-fixing power have been generally declined.
It might be thought that the institution of boards itself restricts
competition, and that even boards without any regulatory powertheir institution is possible-would have a restrictive effect. To a
certain extent this is true. But group activity could also have transpired had there been no boards, and the tendency is counterbalanced
by the moderation imposed by their official position. The ability to
restrict is further limited by the fact that the national output-of
which more than one-third is exported-must be sold in both the
domestic and export markets in competition with foreign producers.
It would seem, therefore, that the degree of competitiveness does not
depend primarily on the institution of boards, but on the competitive
position in international trade and, insofar as particular segments of
the industry are not subject to foreign competition, on the judgment
of public opinion. In this respect, it is remarkable that the existing
cartels have been so hesitant to convey their activities to boards.
The last mentioned phenomenon once again shows that the development of the boards is still in a provisional stage-as was said,
the main development of boards has been in the small business branches
of industry. In industries where, in the entrepreneur's view at least,
a board has no clear advantages over private organizations, applications come slowly. However, pressure may be expected in these areas
from the labor unions, since the boards offer them an opportunity to
realize participation in organizational activity in economic matters.
Government policy and also Council policy can be expected to continue
in the direction of fulfillment of the objectives of the act.

